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Efficiency of Adversarial Timeline Competition in
Online Social Networks
Yuedong Xu, Zhujun Xiao, Tianyu Ni, Xin Wang and Eitan Altman
Abstract—Targeted online advertising elicits a potential threat.
A commercial agent has a chance to mitigate the visibility of his
opponents because their sales or services are of similar types. In
this paper, we consider the competition for attention in popular
online social networks (OSNs) that usually employ a timeline-
based homepage to sort messages chronologically in a limited
visible region. A non-cooperative Tullock-like game model is
formulated that consists of a finite amount of benign agents and
one malicious agent. By paying to the OSN, each benign agent
seeks to maximize his utility of visibility, while the malicious
one aims to reduce the utilities of benign agents. Our primary
purposes are to quantify how robust the overall performance
of benign agents is against the malicious action, and how the
OSN’s revenue is influenced. We derive the upper and the lower
bounds of six fundamental measures with regard to the total
utility and the total net utility of benign agents and the OSN’s
revenue under three different scenarios: with and without the
malicious agent, and the maximum. They capture the worst and
the best performances of the benign agents as well as the OSN.
Our study reveals two important insights: i) the performance
bounds are very sensitive to the malicious agent’s willingness to
pay at certain ranges; ii) the OSN acquires more revenues from
this malicious action.
I. INTRODUCTION
Owing to intensive and massive user engagements, Online
social networks (OSNs) have attracted a lot of companies and
organizations (defined as ‘agents‘’ uniformly) to do online
advertising so as to gain visibility from users. The major OSNs
such as Facebook, Twitter, Renren et al. adopt a timeline-
based template in their homepages to sort content in which
it is referred to as News Feed in Facebook and as Timeline
in Twitter. We use the term “timeline” throughout this work.
There are two classical ways to place commercial content on
the timelines of users. One is to display them to all the viewers
in a reverse chronological order. Aged content will be flushed
down by newcomers automatically. An agent can return to the
top of the timeline if he sends a new content again. The other
is to display content to a fraction of targeted viewers for each
agent. Those who pay more to the OSN may receive larger
shares of viewers’ attention in a certain duration.
The dissemination of commercial content on a timeline
possesses three interesting features. Firstly, the visibility (or
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visibile duration) of a content is finite. In a reverse chronolog-
ical timeline, old content are swept away by new content, thus
losing its visibility. Though technically a viewer can scroll
through a very large number of posts, recent eye-tracking
experiment has confirmed that the attention of viewers is
focused on the first several entries [1]. When multiple agents
send content to the timeline, an agent can gain more visibility
via sending messages faster. Hence, a natural competition
arises among these agents. In a periodically changing timeline,
OSNs can take down content of agents after a fixed time
interval, which also throttles their visibility. Secondly, targeted
advertising, though delivering content to preferred viewers
effectively, induces a new type of malicious behavior. OSNs
offer an unprecedented way of advertising by mining the
rich data (e.g. posts and profiles) about their users. With
targeted advertising, the agents competing for visibility may
promote the sales of similar products or services, e.g. they
are all dealers of articles for babies. Hence, an established
agent in the market can utilize this opportunity to mitigate the
visibility of his opponents. While in the absence of targeted
advertising, he has no incentive to diminish the visibility of
agents who are usually not of the same type. Meanwhile, the
coessential agents (e.g. restaurants) are usually located in the
same geographical region (e.g. shopping mall or streets) due
to the famous “Hotelling’s Law” [2]. When they compete
for visibility in location based mobile social networks, an
established agent can play the role of the malicious advertiser.
Last but not the least, the agents possess heterogeneous
utilities toward visibility on the timeline. The same level of
visibility may bring different utilities to different agents. The
utility of an agent has quite a few interpretations. For instance,
the agent’s utility corresponds to monetary return if it is
promoting the sale of certain products, and to the satisfaction
from viewer’s attention if it is spreading the publicity of
news. This heterogeneity significantly increases the difficulty
to understand the competition for visibility.
In this paper, we model the timeline competition as a non-
cooperative game where the players consist of a finite number
of benign agents and one malicious agent. The strategy of
a player is his rate to post messages to the timeline. To
capture the visibility of an agent, we build three practical
metrics, mean number of messages, fraction of visible time
and fraction of viewers. Interestingly, these different metrics
are found to be functions of the ratio that an agent’s sending
rate is divided by the aggregate rate of all the agents. This
rate proportional sharing rule bears the similar form as the
Tullock or Lottery contest in economic literature and the Kelly
2mechanism in communication networks [3]. All the agents
make payments to the OSN in proportion to their sending
rates. The advent of targeted advertising breeds a new threat to
OSNs. A benign agent only expects to acquire more publicity
to their products or services, considering the cost of sending
messages. While the malicious agent is usually an established
brand or organization. His utility is not hailing from his
visibility on the timeline, but from the utility losses of all the
benign agents. The hostility of the malicious agent is captured
by his willingness to pay or willingness factor. The willingness
factor refers to a scalar that the malicious agent wishes to use
unit cost to trade for the loss of aggregate utility of the benign
agents. Hence, his objective is to minimize the total utility of
benign agents minus the payment to the OSN.
In our timeline competition game, the benign agents are
usually heterogeneous in their utilities for a given visibility.
Meanwhile, the willingness factor of the malicious agent varies
in different contexts. Therefore, it is much more meaningful
to understand their general impacts on the Nash equilibrium
(NE) than to solve the NE in each individual case. We are
faced with the following fundamental question: To what extent
can the malicious agent mitigate the utility and the net utility
of benign agents, and influence the revenue of the OSN on the
timeline? To answer this question, we analyze the total utility
U and the total net utility V of the benign agents and the total
revenue of the OSN W under three scenarios: i) NE of the
game excluding the malicious agent (nom), ii) NE of the game
consisting of the malicious agent (mal), iii) the maximum
measures excluding the malicious agent (max). We compare
the above performance measures in different scenarios via
their upper and lower bounds. The bounds of UmalUmax ,
Vmal
Vmax
and WmalWmax indicate the best and the worst measures when
the malicious agent possibly participates, in comparison to
the maximum measures without him. The bounds of UmalUnom ,Vmal
Vnom and
Wmal
Wnom demonstrate the best and the worst changes
of performance measures between the two NEs excluding
and including the malicious agent. Our study reveals two
interesting phenomena: the willingness factor of the malicious
agent in certain ranges can remarkably reduce the upper and
the lower bounds of the benign agents’ total utility and total
net utility; the OSN obtains better revenue from the malicious
action against targeted advertising. In addition, given a fixed
number of players on the timeline, a more accurate targeted
advertising generates better revenues to the OSN and improves
the net utility of the malicious agent, while reducing the utility
and the net utility of the benign agents.
We summarize our main results and contributions as fol-
lows.
1) We formulate the timeline competition with targeted
advertising as a non-cooperative game. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work to assess the impact of
potential malicious actions against the timeline advertising.
2) For general utility functions, we quantify the lower
bounds of UmalUmax ,
Umal
Unom ,
Vmal
Vmax and
Vmal
Vnom that are jointly
determined by the number of benign agents (N ) and the
willingness factor (θ).
3) For linear utility functions, UmalUmax has the upper bound
min{1, N1+Nθ}, and the upper bound of VmalVmax takes four
different values with regard to the willingness factor.
4) We compute the upper and the lower bounds of WmalWmax
and WmalWnom for linear utility functions. As θ grows, the both
bounds of WmalWmax increase. The ratio
Wmal
Wnom is lower bounded
by 1 and its upper bound is ∞.
5) We generalize our model to the imperfect targeted
advertising. The sending rate of the malicious agent increases,
and the utility and the net utility of benign agents increase as
the targeted advertising loses its accuracy.
Theoretically speaking, the Tullock contest possesses a
variety of applications, and resembles Kelly’s mechanism
[4] in bandwidth allocation problems. Johari and Tsitsiklis’s
fundamental study announced that the maximum loss of the
aggregate utility is bounded to be 1/4 due to the selfishness
of users. However, they did not consider other important
measures beside the aggregate utility such as the aggregate net
utility. The bound of efficiency loss with a finite number of
users is overlooked, which is very important in new network-
ing applications. Our game model is mathematically the same
as the one in [5] that introduces a malicious user, while the
authors mainly focused on the bound of efficiency loss in the
aggregate utility and the asymptotic bound. Meanwhile, only
the lower bounds are investigated in which the computation
of upper bounds are left open. Resolving the above theoretic
problems is very challenging and a set of new approaches
are indispensable. On the basis of the seminal studies by [3]
and [5], we systematically derive the efficiency losses from
three important aspects: multiple essential measures for the
efficiency, the regime of finite number of competitors, and the
upper bounds.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Section
II formulates the mathematical model of timeline competition
and performance measures. In section III we present the upper
and lower bounds of different measures on the efficiency losses
of benign agents. Section IV investigates the impact of the
malicious agent’s action on the revenue of OSN. Numerical
results are given in section V to validate the accuracy of our
theoretic bounds. Section VI discusses the general application
and related extensions, and section VII concludes this work.
A. Related Work
We describe the closely related works from three perspec-
tives and summarize our major differences from the literature.
Timeline Competition: An important feature is that pop-
ular OSNs such as Facebook, Google+ and Twitter adopt
a timeline-based template to sort content reverse chrono-
logically. [6] first studied the competition between different
content creators on a user’s timeline. The timeline competition
is modeled as a non-cooperative game in [7] that is in the
standard form of Kelly mechanism. They further extended the
Kelly mechanism to the parallel competition on multiple topics
in a timeline [8]. Fully dynamic and semi-dynamic models
have been proposed in [9] and [10] respectively to characterize
the competition on followers’ timeline over time.
Contest Theory: In politics and economics, there are many
situations where agents fight over property rights. The kernel
3feature of a contest is the contest success function (CSF)
developed from the seminal work by Tullock [11], [12].
Rent-seeking, a specific contest, was studied in [13] and a
lobbying contest was studied in [14]. The Tullock CSF is
the special case of our timeline competition model when the
utility functions are all linear and the malicious agent does not
exist. More recently, the studies on CSF mainly focus on the
equilibrium analysis with incomplete information [15], [16]
and the design of CSF mechanism [17], [18].
Bandwidth Allocation Games: F.P. Kelly proposed a market
mechanism in which each user submits a “bid” per unit time
to the network operator, and the network operator determines
the share of each user at a link [4]. In particular, the bandwidth
share is proportional to his bid and inversely proportional
to the sum of all users’ bids at a single link. Johari and
Tsitsiklis [3] found that under Kelly’s mechanism, the selfish
behavior of the users lead to an aggregate utility that is no
worse than 3/4 of the maximum possible aggregate utility. A
“malicious” player was introduced in the Kelly mechanism to
study the lower bound of the total utility of benign users at an
infinite population regime [5]. Other important works studied
the performance of market equilibriums and the convergence
of best response dynamics when players compete on multiple
servers or links simultaneously [19], [20].
Brief Summary: Our study differs from the literature on
timeline competition and contest theory in two aspects: i) we
consider the presence of a malicious agent in particular for
targeted advertising, while all the agents are assumed to be
selfish in the existing works; ii) we study the worst and the
best performance of the contest with heterogeneous agents that
have not been considered before. Our study distinguishes from
the literature on bandwidth allocation games in three aspects:
iii) we consider finite number of agents; iv) three different
performance measures are compared and v) both the lower
and (some) upper bounds are investigated.
II. MODEL AND MEASURES
In this section, we present three practical metrics to quantify
the visibility of content and propose a novel game model to
capture the adversarial competition for viewers’ attention.
A. Practical Metrics
We consider the competition of visibility in an OSN that
use a timeline-based template to sort messages in a reverse
chronological order. An agent is able to post messages to the
timeline of targeted viewers at the cost of monetary payment
to the OSN. In fact, a mobile screen or a desktop can display a
very finite number of commercial messages. The newly arrived
messages are likely to flush away the old ones. A natural
competition arises when multiple agents use this timeline
for commercial promotions or advertising campaigns. Fig.1
illustrates such a competition on a timeline that can display at
most K messages. We suppose that there exist N+1 agents
denoted by A={A0,A1, · · ·,AN}. Each agent sends messages
with a mean rate denoted by xi for all Ai∈A. Denote by x
the vector of mean arrival rates. The messages outside of the
first K cannot receive any attention. To solicit our analytical
model, we examine three concrete performance metrics with
regard to the viewers’ attention, denoted by M(x).
Fig. 1. Illustration of Timeline Competition
Metric 1 - Mean Number of Messages: Each agent cares
about the average number of messages belong to him on the
visible timeline. To be noted, we do not assume the restrictive
Poisson arrival of messages. We use the definition of Palm
probability which is the probability seen at an arrival instant.
Consider the message arrival to the timeline that is captured
by a superposition of N+1 stationary ergodic point process.
Each point process has a finite and positive intensity xi for i =
0, 1, · · · , N . Let pi(·) be the Palm probability of the ergodic
point process that corresponds to point process for agent Ai.
According to [6] and [7], the Palm probability is given by
pi(x) =
xi
z , ∀ 0≤i≤N, where z =
∑N
i=0 xi. This means that
at an arrival instant, a displayed message is send by agent Ai
with probability pi(x). Then, the mean number of messages on
the timeline that belong to Ai is given by Mi(x) = Kxi/z.
Metric 2 - Fraction of Visible Time: Each agent is interested
in the fraction of time that his messages can be found in
a viewer’s timeline. The message delivery of Ai follows a
Poisson process with the rate xi for all Ai ∈ A. Hence, the
timeline can be modeled as a continuous time Markov chain
(CTMC) with K states. Each state represents a vector of mes-
sages occupying the kth visible position. Similarly, according
to [7], the fraction of time that Ai’s messages can be seen in
the timeline is Mi(x) = 1− (1 − xi/z)K , ∀ 0 ≤ i ≤ N .
Metric 3 - Fraction of Viewers: On the timelines of some
OSNs, commercial messages are displayed in floating win-
dows. The current messages are not flushed away by incoming
new ones, but are replaced after a certain period. By paying
a fee xi, agent Ai is exposed to a certain fraction of viewers
given by Mi(x) = xi/z, i = 0, 1, · · · , N .
Remark 1: A universal feature holds in the above metrics that
all are functions of xiz . We call
xi
z the fraction of viewers’
attention of Ai. This feature is significant in that we are
able to explore the general properties of timeline competition.
Furthermore, if the metrics are linear to xiz , the timeline
competition is equivalent to standard Tullock mechanism in
economics and Kelly mechanism in resource allocation.
B. Basic Model
We distinguish N+1 agents into two groups where those
in the set {A1, · · · ,AN} are benign and A0 is malicious.
Every benign agent wants to utilize the timeline to gain
visibility by paying for commercial messages. His purpose
4is to achieve an optimal tradeoff between his utility through
OSN advertising and the cost of message delivery. On the
contrary, the malicious agent, instead of caring about his own
visibility, aims to mitigate the benefit of timeline advertising
of other benign agents. This adversarial timeline competition
is feasible when the malicious agent and the benign agents
are promoting the sales of similar products or services, or
disseminating similar types of messages.
The targeted online advertising has turned the adversarial
timeline competition into reality. There are two representative
ways to perform targeted advertising. One is to recommend
potential viewers to the agents by mining the viewer behaviors
from history data or by infringing the privacy of viewers. For
instance, the OSN provider can infer the needs of timeline
viewers based on their posts, and then deliver advertisements
to the timeline of selected viewers. The other is through topic
classification, in which the viewers in each topic (e.g. infant,
tourism) possess the same preference of purchases. In our
context, timeline advertising on social media is less expensive
than traditional media (e.g. TV, newspaper, etc.) to gain
attentions for smaller companies or new comers. A0 usually
plays the role of an established company who aims to prohibit
his competitors from utilizing social media advertising.
Utility Model: We hereby model utilities of all the agents.
Recall that x={x0, x1, · · · , xN} are a vector of mean arrival
rates of messages to the timeline. Let di=xiz be the frac-
tion of Ai’s arrival rate over the total arrival rate, and let
d={d0, d1, · · ·, dN} be the corresponding vector. Denote by
UAi(di) the utility of Ai on the timeline, given the fraction of
attention di. The cost of sending a message is denoted by c in
which we assume the unit price (i.e. c:=1) if not mentioned
explicitly. The net utility of a benign agent Ai, VAi (x), is
defined as the difference between the utility and the cost,
VAi(x) = UAi(di)− cxi, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ N. (1)
If UAi is interpreted as money, then VAi is actually the profit;
if UAi reflects Ai’s satisfaction from viewers’ attention, VAi
may not refer to the profit, but the net gain of performing
timeline advertising. Similar to the assumptions made in prior
works on network resource allocation [3] and [5], we employ
the following assumption on the utility of benign agents.
Assumption P1: Each Ui(di) : R+ 7→ R+ is non-negative,
strictly concave, strictly increasing and continuously differen-
tiable in xi, and is strictly convex and strictly decreasing in
xj for all i ≥ 1, j ≥ 0 and j 6= i.
The objective of the malicious agent is to neutralize the
utilities of all other benign agents. Hence, the net utility of
A0 is expressed as
VA0(x) = −θ
∑N
i=1
UAi(di)− cx0, (2)
where θ > 0 is the willingness to pay (or willingness factor)
of the malicious agent. Note that θ captures A0’s resolution to
reduce the total utilities of benign agents. At an extreme point
θ = 0, A0 does not participate in the timeline competition in
any situation, while at the other extreme point θ → ∞, A0
creates messages with an infinite intensity to flush away those
of all the benign agents. Or the malicious agent pays as much
as possible to the OSN so to occupy all the visible space of the
timeline. A similar utility model has been proposed initially
to characterize Internet Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
attack in [5]. However, the metrics to evaluate the outcome
of DDoS attack/defence can hardly be taken for our timeline
competition. Our major differences will be elaborated at the
end of this section.
Remark 2: If we assume that A0 wants to neutralize the net
utility of benign agents, it is equivalent since by adding to
VA0 the costs of benign agents that does not depend on A0.
Game Model: We formulate the competition of viewers’ eye-
balls as a noncooperative game denoted by G that comprises
three key elements:
- Players: a set of advertising agents {A0,A1, · · · ,AN};
- Strategies: each player’s strategy is the intensity of sending
messages, i.e. xi for all i = 0, 1, · · · , N ;
- Payoffs: the payoff of a player is his net utility, i.e.
(VA0 , VA1 , · · · , VAN ).
For the game G, we define its Nash Equilibrium (NE) as
the following.
Definition 1: (Nash Equilibrium) Let x = (x0, x1, · · · , xN )
be the set of feasible arrival rates of advertisers, and
x−i=x\{xi}. A strategy profile x∗ is a Nash equilibrium if
VAi(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i)≥VAi(xi,x∗−i) for any xi 6= x∗i and any Ai ∈ A.
We further define a special type of utility function.
Definition 2: (Linear Utility Function) The utility of benign
agent Ai is a linear function if it is in the form
UAi(di) = vidi, ∀i = 1, · · · , N, (3)
where vi is regarded as Ai’s valuation on the visibility of
the whole timeline. The valuations are sorted in a decreasing
order, i.e. v1≥v2≥ · · · ≥vN with v1 normalized as 1.
C. Performance Measures
We define three measures to quantify the outcomes of time-
line competition: total utility (U) and total net utility (V) of be-
nign agents as well as total OSN revenue (W). Formally, there
have U =∑Ni=1 UAi , V = U−∑Ni=1 cxi, W =∑Ni=0 cxi
where c is taken as 1 without loss of generality. Here, U and
V are pertinent to the benefits of timeline advertising reaped
by the benign agents, and W reflects the benefit obtained by
the OSN. It is noteworthy that W may contain the payment
from the malicious agent if it is included. The competitions
take place among the benign agents, and between the benign
agents and the malicious agent. They are expected to reduce
the utility and the net utility of the benign agents, and affect
the revenue of the OSN. To capture the efficiency of the
malicious agent to neutralize the gains of the benign agents
and his impact on the OSN’s revenue, we compare U (resp. V
and W) in three scenarios: MAL, NOM and MAX. Here,
MAL is the game consisting of all the players in A; NOM
is the game excluding the malicious agent A0; MAX refers
to the optimal measures (i.e. aggregate utility and aggregate
net utility of benign agents, and OSN’s total revenue) when
excluding the malicious agent A0. In general, the utility
functions of the benign agents are rather diverse; one has
5to investigate enormous cases so to understand the impact of
malicious behavior on the performance measures. In stead of
pursuing case-by-case studies, we resort to the worst and the
best performance for versatile utility functions. Therefore, our
primary goals are to quantify the following bounds:
• B1: UmalUmax , the gap between the total utility (or satisfac-
tion) at the NE of MAL and the maximum total utility
(or satisfaction) of benign agents.
• B2: UmalUnom , the damage to the total utility (or satisfaction)
of benign agents at two NEs of MAL and NOM
respectively.
• B3: VmalVmax , the dissipation of total net utility of benign
agents at the NE ofMAL in comparison to the maximum
total net utility of benign agents.
• B4: VmalVnom , the damage to the total net utility of benign
agents at two NEs of MAL and NOM respectively.
• B5: WmalWmax , the ratio between the OSN’s revenue at the
NE of MAL and the maximum revenue of the OSN in
the game MAL. It can be larger than 1.
• B6: WmalWnom , the ratio between the OSN’s revenue at the
NE of MAL and that at the NE of NOM. It can be
larger than 1.
The bounds B1, B3 and B5 mainly capture the absolute
performance at the NE with the possible emergence of the
malicious agent (compared with the maximum performance
free of the malicious agent). While the bounds B2, B4 and
B6 look into the relative changes brought by the possible
emergence of the malicious agent.
In the seminal work [5], the total utility of benign users
is the main concern. The lower bound of UmalUmax has been
analyzed in the extreme with unlimited number of players.
In comparison, our novel features are highlighted as below.
i): We consider a more challenging setting, i.e. finite number
of the benign agents, such that existing methodologies in [3]
and [5] to find the bounds do not apply in general;
ii): The bounds B2∼B6 have not been studied previously.
iii): In addition to the lower bounds, we further obtain the
upper bounds to exhibit the best performance measures for
benchmark linear utility functions;
iv): We study the bounds of OSN’s revenue on the timeline;
v): We extend our model to the situation of imperfect
targeted advertising.
III. EFFICIENCY LOSS OF BENIGN AGENTS
In this section, we obtain the bounds of performance mea-
sures for timeline competition. Our analyses provide deep
understandings on how (in)efficient the malicious agent can
neutralize the benefits of the benign agents.
A. Nash Equilibrium
We first echo that the timeline game G induces a unique
Nash equilibrium. The uniqueness has been proved in Kelly’s
mechanism (price anticipating bandwidth sharing game) with
only benign users [3], and in the DDoS attack game [5]. Here,
a couple of known results are summarized.
Theorem 1: (Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium)[5] The game
G has a unique Nash Equilibrium x≥0 under assumption P1,
where at least two components of x are positive.
Remark 3: The condition for unique NE in the price antici-
pating bandwidth sharing game [3] is less stronger that that
of our timeline competition and the DDoS attack game [5].
The former only requires that Ui(di) is strictly increasing and
strictly concave in di, while the latter requires P1.
The above theorem also implies that a subset of agents may
not send messages to the timeline. We claim that Ai does not
participate in the competition if x∗i = 0 at the NE. In the
standard Kelly’s mechanism, at least two players participate
at the NE. This is also true in the timeline competition with
the specialty that these two players can be one benign agent
and the malicious agent. Let us first examine the participation
of players at the NE. Solving the best response for each
player, we obtain the NE optimality conditions (denoted as
NE CONDs).
U ′Ai(d
∗
i )
z∗−i
(z∗)2
− c
{
= 0 if x∗i > 0
≤ 0 if x∗i = 0
∀i ≥ 1, (4)
−θ
∑N
i=1
U ′Ai(d
∗
i )
x∗i
(z∗)2
− c
{
= 0 if x∗0 > 0
≤ 0 if x∗0 = 0 (5)
where U ′Ai(di) is the derivative of UAi(di) over di and c = 1
if not mentioned explicitly.
NE CONDs in Eqs.(4) and (5) do not yield close-form
expression of the NE, thus not allowing further understanding
on its property.
Remark 4: If multiple malicious agents with different willing-
ness factors coexist, NE CONDs manifest that only the one
with the largest willingness factor participates in the timeline
competition. This mathematically justifies why we only need
to consider a single malicious agent.
Here, we compute the NE when the utilities of the benign
agents are linear functions of the viewers’ attention. Our
purpose is to scrutinize the participation of players on top of
an explicit-form NE. Based on the NE CONDs, we hereby
present a method to search the explicit NE within N steps. The
first step is to compute x∗ by assuming the participation of
n=N benign agents at the NE. If x∗i is positive for all Ai∈A,
the NE is obtained. Otherwise, if any x∗i is negative, this
means that some of the benign agents or the malicious agent
do not participate in the timeline competition. By removing
the concurrent benign agent with the smallest valuation or the
malicious agent, we proceed to search until n=1. For any n
benign agents at the NE, x∗i is given by{
x∗i =
(∑n
j=1 1/vj
n−1 − 1vi
)(
n−1∑
n
j=1 1/vj
)2
x∗0 = 0
, (6)
if there exists θ < n−1∑n
j=1 vj
∑
n
j=1 1/vj−n(n−1) . Then, all the
participants are benign agents. Otherwise, there has
 x
∗
i =
( n+1/θ∑
n
j=1 vj
− 1vi
)(∑n
j=1 vj
n+1/θ
)2
x∗0 =
∑n
j=1 vj
n+1/θ
(∑n
j=1 vj
∑n
j=1 1/vj
n+1/θ +1−n
) , (7)
if θ is no less than the above threshold. Here, the malicious
agent participates in the timeline competition. We further
6present general properties w.r.t. the participation of the benign
agents when the utilities are linear to their viewers’ attention.
Theorem 2: (Participation of Players for Linear Utility) The
NE x∗ has the following properties:
• if θ > N−1N , then there always has x
∗
0 > 0;
• if vi > vj and x∗j > 0, then x∗i>x∗j>0 ∀1 ≤ i, j ≤ N ;
• if vi = vj for all i, j, then x∗i > 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
All the proofs can be found in the appendix.
Theorem 2 shows the conditions that the benign agents or
the malicious agent to post messages. When θ is larger than a
fixed threshold, A0 will always send messages to the timeline,
regardless of the valuations of benign agents. The second bullet
shows that the benign agents with higher valuations are more
likely to participate at the NE.
B. Lower Bounds for General Utility Functions
In general, each benign agent has a different utility func-
tion w.r.t the viewers’ attention. How this heterogeneity may
influence the total utility and the total net utility of benign
agents remains unknown. It is also vital to understand to what
extent the malicious agent can mitigate the benefits of online
advertising of the benign ones. For arbitrary utility functions,
the exact U , V and W are highly variable without revealing
general properties. Hence, we are interested in the bounds of
Umal
Umax ,
Umal
Unom ,
Vmal
Vmax and
Vmal
Vnom under the assumption P1.
The analysis of bounds can be retrospected to the seminal
work [3] in which the lower bound of UnomUmax is
3
4 without A0.
This bound is tight: there exists a choice of intensity vector
x such that Unom at the NE is infinitely close to 34 of the
optimal total utility. A recent work in [5] study the same
model as ours in the context of DDoS attac/prevention and
provide a lower bound of UmalUmax as N approaches infinity. The
differences between our model and the above seminal works
have been highlighted in five aspects (see Section 2.3). Johari
and Tsitsiklis [3] showed in Theorem 2.2 and Lemma 4 that
the NE U over the social optimal U has a lower bound, and this
bound is tight in the case of linear utility functions. Following
their approach, we obtain a similar tightness of bound with
regard to VmalVmax ,
Umal
Unom and
Vmal
Vnom .
Theorem 3: (Condition for Lower Bounds) The lower bound
of VmalVmax (
Umal
Unom and
Vmal
Vnom resp.) is tight in the case of linear
utility functions of the benign agents.
Henceforth, to find the lower bounds of performance mea-
sures with heterogeneous valuations, we only need to compute
the bounds for benign agents with linear utility functions. The
NE of MAL game is given in Eqs. (6) and (7). Here, we want
to answer two questions regarding the arbitrary valuations: i)
How can the malicious agent neutralize the total utility of the
benign agents, and how can he accelerate the dissipation of
their total net utility? ii) When are the lower bounds tight
and what are the asymptotic bounds in the regime of infinite
number of benign agents? To these goals, we need to compute
the NEs in MAL and NOM as well as the maximum measures.
The following theorem states the lower bound of UmalUmax .
Theorem 4: (Lower Bound of Total Utility over Maximum)
Given linear utility functions of the benign agents, the ratio
Umal
Umax has the following lower bound
Umal
Umax ≥
{
(1+θ)−1, if θ>
(√
N
N−1+1)
2−1)−1
1−(N−1)(
√
N−√N−1)2, otherwise
(8)
where the equality in the former is reached at vi = 0
for i ≥ 2, and the equality in the latter is reached at
vi =
√
N(N−1)−(N−1) for i ≥ 2.
The asymptotic bound of UmalUmal has been proved in [5] as the
following.
Lemma 1: [5] As N →∞, the asymptotic lower bound is
Umal
Umax ≥ min{
3
4
,
1
1+θ
}. (9)
where 3/4 is reached at vi = 1/2 for i ≥ 2.
Remark 5: The lower bound of UmalUmax consists of two cases.
When θ is greater than a certain threshold, the utility loss
of benign agents is governed by θ. The larger θ is, the
smaller bound of efficiency loss will be. In this situation, the
bound is tight when only the benign agent with the highest
valuation and the malicious one battle on the timeline. When
the willingness factor is below that threshold, the efficiency
loss is completely caused by the competition among benign
agents. The bound is tight when all the benign agents except
A1 have the identical valuation asymptotically approaching 12 .
The asymptotic lower bound for N →∞ has been proved in
[5] that uses a different approach introduced by [3].
We proceed to compare the total utilities at two NEs of
the games MAL and NOM. In the latter, the efficiency loss
is caused by the competition among benign agents, while in
former, the possible participation of the malicious agent may
aggravate the efficiency loss.
Theorem 5: (Lower Bound of Total Utility With/Without
Malicious Agent) Given linear utility functions of the benign
agents, UmalUnom has the following lower bound
Umal
Unom ≥
1
1 + θ
(10)
where it is tight for any v2 ≤ θ1+θ .
Remark 6: Even though θ is small, the malicious agent can
still nuetralize the total utility of benign agents in the worst
case. As θ increases, the utility loss grows accordingly. The
lower bound is not influenced by the number of benign agents.
The net utility reflects the gain of a benign agent performing
advertising on the timeline. When the net utility is small, it
may have less incentive to send messages so to gain viewer’s
attention. The competition among all the agents results in the
dissipation of the gains of benign agents. It is crucial to capture
to what extent the presence of the malicious agent accelerates
the dissipation of the total net utility.
Theorem 6: (Lower Bound of Total Net Utility over Max-
imum) Define a variable v˜(n) that is the unique positive and
real solution to the equality
2(n−1)v3 + (3− 2n+ θ−2)v2 − 1 = 0 (11)
for all n ∈ {1, · · · , N}. The lower bound of the total net
utility is given by (12).
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Vmax ≥ min{1+
(N−1)(√N2 − 1−(N+1))
1+12
(√
N2−1 + (N−1)) , (1−nθ)(1+(n−1)v˜
(n))
1+nθ
+(1+
n−1
v˜(n)
)(
θ(1+(n−1)v˜(n))
1+nθ
)2}, n = 1, · · ·, N. (12)
Remark 7: Though the lower bound of VmalVmax does not have a
close-form solution, one can still observe that the dissipation
rate of VmalVmax is inversely proportional to N .
Theorem 7: (Lower Bound of Total Net Utility With/Without
Malicious Agent) The ratio VmalVnom has the following lower
bound
Vmal
Vnom ≥
1
(1 + θ)2
. (13)
Remark 8: When the timeline competition consists of the
malicious agent, a slight increase of the willingness factor can
result in a remarkable drop in the total net utility, compared
with that excluding the malicious agent.
C. Upper Bounds for Linear Utility Functions
The upper bounds of the measures are crucial to evaluate
the efficiency of timeline competition. On one hand, they
characterize the best performance of benign agents when
competing not only among themselves, but also with the ma-
licious agent. On the other hand, the upper bounds exhibit the
worst achievable damage caused by the malicious agent when
he intends to send messages to the timeline. Unfortunately,
they have not been studied in the literature. We proceed to
investigate if these upper bounds can be quantified.
Since there does not exist a theorem to offer upper bounds of
performance measures for general utility functions, we resort
to those for linear utility functions. Note that linear utility is
a benchmark utility model in contest theory, and corresponds
to the metrics such as the mean number of messages and the
fraction of viewers in our timeline competition. The following
theorem states the upper bound of UmalUmax .
Theorem 8: (Upper Bound of Total Utility Over Maximum)
Given linear utility functions of the benign agents, the ratio
Umal
Umax is upper bounded by
Umal
Umax ≤
{
1 if θ ≤ N−1N
N
θN+1 otherwise
. (14)
The upper bound is achieved when vi equals to 1 for all i.
Remark 9: When the willingness factor is less that the
threshold that it must participate, the maximum total utility
of the benign agents is still achievable. However, when the
willingness further increases, even a small increment can
give rise to remarkable reduction in the total utility. As N
approaches infinity, the asymptotic upper bound is inversely
proportional to the willingness factor.
We next compare the NEs of MAL and NOM to observe
how the intervention of the malicious agent changes the total
utility of benign agents.
Corollary 1: (Approximated Upper Bound of Total Utility
With/Without Malicious Agent) Given linear utility functions
of the benign agents, the upper bound of UmalUnom is approximated
by
Umal
Unom ≤
{
1 if θ ≤ N−1N
max{ N1+Nθ , (1+θ)
−1
(1−(N−1)(√N−√N−1)2)} otherwise
(15)
where it is tight for any v2 ≤ θ1+θ .
Remark 10: The exact upper bound of UmalUnom does not yield
an explicit form. We pick up two extreme cases. One is that
the willingness factor is slightly greater than N−1N . We find
the scenario to obtain the best Umal and compare it with the
corresponding Unom. The other is that the willingness factor
is large. We find the condition to obtain the worst Unom and
compare it with the corresponding Umal. The upper bound of
Umal
Unom should be better than those in both extreme scenarios.
For the similar reason, this work does not present the upper
bound of VmalVnom .
We further scrutinize to what extent the malicious agent can
mitigate the achievable net utility of the benign agents.
Theorem 9: (Upper Bound of Total Net Utility Over Maxi-
mum) Given linear utility functions of benign agents, the ratio
Vmal
Vmax is upper bounded by
Vmal
Vmax ≤


1
(1+θ)2 if θ ≤
√
2−1
1
2 if
√
2−1 < θ ≤ 12
2
(1+2θ)2 , if
1
2 < θ ≤
√
2
2
1
(1+θ)2 , if θ >
√
2
2
. (16)
Remark 11: This theorem manifests that the maximum achiev-
able net utility of the benign agents is very sensitive to
the willingness factor. A slight increase of θ can result in
an outstanding reduction of the upper bound. An interesting
observation is that there is a plateau for θ ∈ [√2−1, 1/2],
which means that the malicious agent does not participate at
the NE.
IV. REVENUE OF THE OSN AND IMPERFECT TARGETED
ADVERTISING
In this section, we first study the bounds of the OSN’s
revenue. We then extend our study to consider the efficiency
of imperfect targeted advertising.
A. Bounds of OSN’s Revenue with Linear Utility Functions
We have analyzed the best and the worst bounds w.r.t. the
total utility and the total net utility of benign agents. However,
it is unclear how the malicious agent’s action influences the
revenue of the OSN. In what follows, we compute the bounds
of gains that the malicious agent brings to the OSN with linear
utilities of benign agents.
Theorem 10: (Bounds of OSN’s Revenue over Optimality)
Given linear utility functions of benign agents, the ratio WmalWmax
has the following upper and lower bounds
θN
(1 + θ)(N − 1) ≤
Wmal
Wmax ≤ max{1,
θN2
(1 + θN)(N − 1)}. (17)
8Remark 12: Note that Wmax is the maximum revenue obtained
by the OSN when the malicious agent is excluded. As θ is
small, the lower bound almost increases linear to the increase
of θ. The upper bound means that the malicious agent can
bring more revenues to the OSN. This implies that the OSN
might not supervise the malicious actions against the targeted
advertising.
We then compare the OSN’s revenues in two NEs of MAL
and NOM respectively.
Theorem 11: (Bounds of OSN’s Revenue With/Without Ma-
licious Agent) Given linear utility functions of benign agents,
the ratio WmalWnom has the following upper and lower bounds
1 ≤ WmalWnom ∝ ∞. (18)
Remark 13: This theorem manifests that the OSN can al-
ways harvest more revenues when the malicious agent sends
messages to the timeline. Especially, the participation of the
malicious agent brings an unbounded gain in comparison to
the competition excluding the malicious agent.
We want to know if the OSN can reap a higher revenue by
charging the agents a higher price. The optimal pricing on the
timeline does not yield an explicit solution in general. Thus,
we limit our study to the case with linear utility functions
of benign agents. When c is not 1, the NE is also given by
Eq.(6) and (7) except that vi is substituted by vic . We have an
interesting corollary directly from Eq.(6) and (7).
Corollary 2: Given linear utility functions of benign agents,
the sending rate at the NE decreases with c, while the OSN’s
revenue is not influenced by any positive c.
Thus, the OSN cannot gain more revenue by charging a higher
price to the agents with linear utility functions, even though
they have diverse valuations.
B. Imperfect Targeted Advertising
In this subsection, we extend to consider the efficiency loss
caused by the malicious agent when targeted advertising is
imperfect. Then, NOT all the benign agents are promoting
the sales of similar products or services to the viewers. As
a result, the malicious agent only “battle” against a subset
benign agents denoted by A˜ with A˜ ⊆ A. We definite a vector
of indicators {Ii} that have
Ii =
{
1 if Ai ∈ A˜
0 otherwise , ∀i = 1, · · ·, N. (19)
If Ii = 1, A0 may treat Ai as his enemy. Following the proof
of Theorem 1, one can easily see that the partial competition
of the malicious agent does not alter the uniqueness of NE.
The NE of general utility functions can be obtained from
NE CONDs in Eqs. (4) and (5). For the linear utility functions
in Eq.(3), the uniqueness can be computed in the way as the
full competition if we substitute
∑n
j=1 vj by
∑n
j=1 vjIj and
substitute n+1/θ by
∑n
j=1 Ij+1/θ in Eq.(6).
We next show how the partial competition on the timeline
may change the NE. Consider a simple timeline competition
with N (N ≥ 2) homogeneous benign agents, i.e. vi = 1, ∀i.
The malicious agent aims to reduce the total utility of M self-
ish advertisers with M ≤ N . We only present our observations
since the computation is direct.
i) Participation: All the benign agents will participate in the
competition, and the threshold of A0’s participation is given
by θ > N−1M . This manifests that more “enemies” reduce the
participation threshold of the malicious agent.
ii) Message Arrival Rate: Only the scenario of A0’s partic-
ipation is considered. The message arrival rate of Ai is given
by x∗i = Mθ(1+Mθ)2 for (i > 0) and x
∗
0 =
Mθ+(Mθ)2−NMθ
(1+Mθ)2 .
Due to Mθ > N−1 ≥ 1, as M increases, x∗i decreases for
(i > 0) and x∗0 increases. This means that when the malicious
agent targets at more benign opponents, he will increase the
rate of message delivery and his opponents will decrease it
accordingly.
iii) Performance Measures: The utility and the net utility
of Ai are Ui(d∗) = 11+Mθ and Vi(d∗)= 1(1+Mθ)2 respectively
for i > 0. The total utility and the total net utility are Umal =
N
1+Mθ and Vmal= N(1+Mθ)2 . The net utility of A0 is given by
V0(x
∗) = −2Mθ1+Mθ +
NMθ
(1+Mθ)2 . The total revenue of the OSN is
Mθ
1+Mθ . It is clear to observe that the utility and the net utility
of the benign agents dissipate with the increase of M . The
total revenue of the OSN also increases with M . Hence, the
benign agents who are not targeted by the malicious agent also
suffers from the increases of his “enemies”.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we validate the proposed bounds through
numerical simulations and reveal the important insights on the
efficiency of adversarial timeline competition.
Linear Utility Functions: We hereby compute the perfor-
mance measures for a large number of random tests. In
Fig.2∼8, we consider the timeline competition among five
benign agents (N = 5) and one malicious agent. X-coordinate
denotes the willingness factor, and y-coordinate denotes dif-
ferent ratios respectively. Each marked point in these figures
with a marker represents a corresponding ratio with randomly
generated valuations from uniform distribution in [0 1] (some
points are not plotted simply for reducing the size of image
files). Fig.2 illustrates the upper and the lower bounds of UmalUmax .
The malicious agent does not participate in the worst case of
Umal when θ is less than 0.287. As θ further increases, the
lower bound descends rapidly. Similarly, the malicious agent
does not participate in the best case of Umal when θ is less
than 0.8. A slight increase of θ beyond 0.8 leads to a rapid
decrease of the upper bound. Thus, for the small willingness
factor, we can deem that the efficiency loss in the total utility
is mainly caused by the competition among the benign agents.
The bounds of utility loss are very sensitive to the change of
θ in certain ranges. Fig.3 compares the utilities at two NEs
for the games MAL and NOM. The lower bound is shown
to decrease rapidly even for very small θ. Fig.4 illustrates the
upper and the lower bounds of VmalVmax . The upper bound of
the net utility is shown to be very sensitive to θ, especially
when θ is small. This implies that the best net utility is not
9robust against the malicious actions. The lower bound is a
fixed with small θ, but decreases when θ is above a certain
threshold. This manifests that the loss of net utility is caused
by the competition among the benign agents for small θ and
by the malicious agent for large θ. The lower bound of VmalVnom
is shown in Fig.5, which owns a similar property as the lower
bound of UmalUnom in Fig.3. As θ increases from 0, the lower
bound decreases quickly.
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Fig.6 plots the upper and the lower bounds of WmalWmax . When
θ increases from 0, the lower bound increases accordingly.
When θ is greater than 0.8, the malicious agent is bound to
participate. It is interesting to see that the participation of the
benign agent brings more revenues to the OSN. When θ is
3, the upper bound of the game MAL is nearly 20% higher
than the best revenue in the game MAX. Fig.7 compares
the revenue of the OSN at the NEs MAL and MAX.
The revenue of the OSN in MAL is invariably no less
than that in MAX. Especially, the maximum improvement
in our simulation is more than 70% when θ is 3. In light
of the benefits brought to the OSN, he may renounce the
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regulation of the malicious agent in targeted advertising. Fig.8
plots the timeline competition with N = 100 benign agents.
The valuations of benign agents are identically independent
distributed in [0, 1]. Compared with Fig.2, the results of
random tests are more convergent with N = 100. This implies
that when there N is large, the utility loss of benign agents (or
the damage caused by the malicious agent) is more predictable.
Fig.9 characterizes the net utility of the malicious agent with
imperfect targeted advertising. Here, N is 20 and M denotes
the number of benign agents that are of the same type as
the malicious agent. The valuations of benign agents are 1
uniformly. When M increases, i.e. the targeted advertising
becoming more accurate, while the net utility of the benign
agents decreases.
Logarithmic Utility Functions: We evaluate the correctness
of lower bounds for logarithmic utility functions in the form
UAi(di) = ai log(1 + bidi) where ai and bi are random
positive parameters in the range [0, 1]. The number of benign
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agents is set to five. Fig.10 illustrates the ratio UmalUmax when the
willingness factor θ increases from 0 to 3. The model of lower
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bound is that taken from the scenario of linear utility functions.
One can clearly see that the ratio UmalUmax of logarithmic utility
functions is always above our mathematical bound. Similarly,
the ratios of UmalUnom ,
Vmal
Vmax and
Vmal
Vnom are lowered bounded by
the corresponding lower bounds for linear utility functions.
Note that the upper bounds for linear utility functions do not
apply to the scenarios for logarithmic utility functions.
VI. GENERAL APPLICABILITY AND DISCUSSIONS
General Applicability: The analytical results of this work
can be further applied to investigate the competitive behavior
in network security, resource allocation and rent-seeking is-
sues. In DDoS attacks and defenses, we can deduce to what
extent the congestion pricing can mitigate the harm to the
aggregate utility and net utility of the finite number of benign
users. In rent-seeking contest, our results can be used to
analyze how the aggregate net utility of the benign contenders
dissipates in the presence of a malicious contender. Our study
can be used to analyze the competition of resources in servers
or distributed clusters.
Discussions:
D1: The existence of multiple malicious agents. When there are
multiple malicious agents with different willingness factors,
the NE conditions manifest that only the one with the largest
willingness factor participates in the timeline competition.
Hence, we only need to consider the case of a single malicious
agent.
D2: The ordinary non-advertising messages on a viewer’s
timeline. Let the rate of generating non-advertising messages
be y and z=
∑N
i=0 xi+y. When the advertising and non-
advertising messages are rigidly chronological on the time-
line, the mean number of visible messages is still given
by Mi(x) = Kxi/z. The analysis of Nash equilibrium
follows the same method, but the theoretical bounds should
consider the rate of posting non-advertising messages. When
the advertising messages are chronologically sorted in reserved
locations of the timeline, the competition of advertising con-
tent is not influenced by the generation of non-advertising
content. When the advertising content is delivered to a fraction
of viewers’ timelines based on their payments to the OSN,
it does not compete for visibility with the non-advertising
content. In these two scenarios, our models and analytical
results hold automatically.
D3: The use of auction mechanism in timeline competition.
Auction theory has been widely applied to design the online
advertising mechanism. The advertisements displayed in a
webpage is determined by the bids submitted by the interested
advertisers. In each time, one or more advertising spaces can
be allocated. However, auction mechanism is not suitable to
capture the competition for visibility through posting content
with a reversely chronological order. Hence, we adopt the
Tullock mechanism in which the visibility metrics are derived
from queueing analysis on the timeline. In addition, Tullock
mechanism has the similar form as all-pay auction. Hence, our
analytical results may have a chance to apply to the all-pay
auction in the presence of a malicious player.
D4: The competition for users’ attention without complete
information.
Our focus is to explore the fundamental efficiency of
competition for users’ attention in the presence of a malicious
agent. Hence, similar to the literature [3][5][20], we consider
a complete information game. In reality, an agent is not aware
of the utilities of his opponents when making the decision.
Although complete information is not available, this agent
observes his share of users’ attention in each round. Then,
he can learn the NE strategy according to the best response
dynamics. As long as the utility function of each agent is not
time-varying, the efficiency of competition does not change
even if each agent cannot observe the utilities of all other
agents.
VII. CONCLUSION
This work studies a novel malicious behavior against tar-
geted advertising in the timeline of OSNs. A malicious agent
can pay to the OSN to send commercial content to the
timeline with the purpose of mitigating the utilities of all
his opponents. We model their competition for visibility as
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a non-zero sum non-cooperative game and then investigate
three performance measures: the total utility and the total net
utility of benign agents as well as the OSN’s revenue at the
NE. We compute lower and upper bounds of these measures
in the scenarios whether the malicious agent exists or not
in the game. Our study reveals two significant effects of the
malicious behavior. Firstly, there exist certain thresholds for
the malicious agent’s willingness factor upon which a slight
increase in the willingness factor can reduce the utility and
the net utility of benign agents remarkably. Secondly, the
malicious agent always bring more revenue to the OSN. When
the willingness factor is large, the OSN’s revenue at the NE
can be even greater than the maximum revenue he receives in
the absence of the malicious agent.
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APPENDIX: PROOFS
Proof of Theorem 2
i). The first item can be derived directly from the participa-
tion condition of the malicious agent
θ >
n− 1∑n
i=1 vi
∑n
i=1 1/vi − n(n− 1)
. (20)
The expression
∑n
i=1 vi
∑n
i=1 1/vi has the minimum value n2
for 0 ≤ vi ≤ 1 i = 1, · · · , N . Thus, the participation threshold
of the malicious agent is equal to n−1n , given n benign agents
sending messages to the timeline with positive rates. Since
there has n−1n <
N−1
N , according to (6), x∗0 is always positive
at the NE no matter how many benign agents participate for
θ > N−1N .
ii). For the second item, if x∗i > 0 and x∗j > 0, the NE
conditions yield the following equality
(x∗i − x∗j )
(
∑N
i=1 x
∗
i + x
∗
0)
2
=
1
vj
− 1
vi
. (21)
If vi > vj , there must have x∗i > x∗j .
iii) For the last item, we prove it by contradiction. We
assume x∗j = 0 and x∗i > 0 at the NE when the valuations
of all the benign agents are identical. Then the expression (4)
gives rise to
1∑N
i=1 x
∗
i + x
∗
0
≤ 1
vj
(22)
and
1∑N
i=1 x
∗
i + x
∗
0
− x
∗
i
(
∑N
i=1 x
∗
i + x
∗
0)
2
=
1
vi
. (23)
Because vi equals to vj , it is easy to conclude
x∗i
(
∑N
i=1 x
∗
i + x
∗
0)
2
≤ 0, (24)
which is not true. Thus, x∗i must be positive for all the benign
agents at the NE.
Proof of Theorem 3
We will show that the worst case occurs with linear utility
functions of benign agents. Our proof follows the approach
introduced by Johari and Tsitsiklis [3].
i). Consider an arbitrary strategy x¯ and the social optimal
strategy xS that yield the corresponding shares of viewers’
attention, d¯ = {d¯1, d¯2, · · · , d¯N} and dS = {dS1 , dS2 , · · · , dSN}.
The concavity of UAi(d¯i) leads to
UAi(d¯i) + U
′
Ai(d¯i)(d
S
i − d¯i) ≥ UAi(d¯Si ), i = 1, · · · ,N. (25)
Therefore, we obtain a series of inequalities
V(x¯)
V(xS) =
∑N
i=1(UAi(d¯i)− x¯i)∑N
i=1(UAi(d¯
S
i )−x¯Si )
≥
∑N
i=1(UAi(d¯i)−x¯i)∑N
i=1 UAi(d¯
S
i )
≥
∑N
i=1
(
UAi(d¯i)−U ′Ai(d¯i)d¯i
)
+
∑N
i=1
(
U ′Ai(d¯i)d¯i−x¯i
)
∑N
i=1
(
UAi(d¯i)−U ′Ai(d¯i)d¯i
)
+
∑N
i=1 U
′
Ai(d¯i)d
S
i
.(26)
We next derive two inequalities to simplify the above expres-
sion. Because dSi is a fraction with
∑N
i=1 d
S
i ≤ 1, the follow-
ing inequality holds,
∑N
i=1 U
′
Ai(d¯i)d
S
i ≤ maxi U ′Ai(d¯i). Since
UAi(d¯i) is concave and strictly increasing with UAi(0) = 0,
we obtain that the expression UAi(d¯i)−U ′Ai(d¯i)d¯i is nonneg-
ative. Therefore, Eq.(26) satisfies
V(x¯)
V(xS) ≥
∑N
i=1
(
U ′Ai(d¯i)d¯i−x¯i
)
maxi U ′Ai(d¯i)
. (27)
Let x∗ be the unique NE strategy, and d∗ be the vector of
attention shares at this NE. We define a new class of linear
utility functions as
U¯i(di) = Ui(d
∗
i )
′di, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ N. (28)
If we let x¯ = x∗ (also d¯ = d∗ accordingly), the denominator
in the right-hand of Eq.(27) is the NE, and the nominator is
actually the social optimal total net utility of benign agents.
Therefore, we can see that the worst-case ratio VmalVmax occurs
in the case of linear utility functions.
Following the same approach, we can also find that the
ratios UmalUnom and
Vmal
Vnom take the minimum values upon which
the utilities of benign agents are linear functions.
Proof of Theorem 4
We consider two cases at the NE separately, i.e. x∗0 = 0 and
x∗0 > 0.
Case 1: x∗0 = 0. When the malicious agent does not participate
at the NE, there are at least two benign agents sending
messages to the timeline. We assume that the top n benign
agents participate at the NE. Then, the minimum total utility
is the result of the following problem:
min U(d∗) (29)
s.t. 0 ≤ vi ≤ 1, ∀i = 2 · · · , n. (30)
When A0 does not participate, the NE conditions are expressed
as
vi∑n
j=1 x
∗
j
− vix
∗
i
(
∑n
j=1 x
∗
j )
2
= 1, ∀i = 2 · · · , n. (31)
After some simple manipulations, there has∑n
i=1
x∗j =
n− 1∑n
j=1 1/vj
. (32)
The utility of each Ai is obtained by
vid
∗
i = vi −
∑n
j=1
x∗j = vi −
n− 1∑n
j=1 1/vj
. (33)
We next show that U is a convex function over the vector
of valuations {vi}ni=2 and the minimum is obtained at the
boundary of the feasible region. The Hessian matrix of U is
given by
H = 2n(n−1)
(
∑n
i=1 1/vi)
3
·

∑n
i=1, 6=2
1
vi
− v2
v2
3
· · · − v2v2n
− v3
v2
2
∑n
i=1, 6=3
1
vi
· · · − v3v2n
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
− vn
v2
2
− vn
v2
3
· · · ∑n−1i=1 1vi

 .
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Here, we omit the positive constant 2n(n−1)(∑ni=1 1/vi)3 and denote
the Hessian matrix as Hˆ. Define two matrices Hˆ1 and Hˆ2 as
Hˆ1 = Diag(
∑n
i=1
1
vi
), Hˆ2 =


v2
v2
2
v2
v2
3
· · · v2v2n
v3
v2
2
v3
v2
3
· · · v3v2n
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
vn
v2
2
vn
v2
3
· · · vnv2n


where Hˆ = Hˆ1−Hˆ2. Hˆ1 is a full-rank diagonal matrix whose
diagonal elements are the same, while the rank of Hˆ2 is only
1. Thus, the matrix Hˆ has m − 1 identical eigenvalue which
is
∑n
i=1
1
vi
. The last unknown eigenvalue is computed as 1v1
and we validate it as the following. Define a new matrix as
Hˆ3 that has
Hˆ3 = Hˆ − Diag( 1
v1
)
=


∑n
i=3
1
vi
− v2
v2
3
· · · − v2v2n
− v3
v2
2
∑n
i=2, 6=3
1
vi
· · · − v3v2n
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
− vn
v2
2
− vn
v2
3
· · · ∑n−1i=2 1vi

 .
For each column j(j ≥ 2), we multiply it by vj+1v2 and add
to column 1. Then, column 1 becomes a zero vector, which
validates the existence of an eigenvalue to be 1v1 . All the
eigenvalues of the Hessian matrix H are positive which means
that H is strictly positive definite. Hence, U is a convex
function so that it is maximized at the point vi = 1 for
1 ≤ i ≤ n and the maximum value is 1 (i.e. Umax = 1).
Because U is strictly convex over the set of valuations
{vi}ni=2, the minimum utility U is chosen at the point that
has ∂U∂vi = 0 for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n if they exist. By letting the
first-order derivatives be 0, we obtain the optimal valuation v∗i
by
v∗i =
√
n(n−1)− (n−1), 2 ≤ i ≤ n. (34)
Submitting Eq.(34) to (33), we obtain the lowest total utility
of benign agents by
U(d∗) = 1− (n−1)(√n−√n− 1)2. (35)
To find the monotonicity between U and n, we assume that n
is a continuous variable. We take the derivative of U over n
and obtain
dU
dn
= 3
√
n(n− 1)−3(n−1)−n+(n−1)
√
n−1
n
=
1√
n
(
√
n− 1−√n)3 < 0. (36)
Given N benign agents competing for the viewers’ attention,
the minimum total utility is obtained by
Umal ≥ 1− (N−1)
(√
N −
√
N − 1)2. (37)
The total message rate of the benign agents at this NE is
computed as∑N
i=1
x∗i =
N − 1∑N
j=1 1/vj
=
N − 1√
N(N−1) +N . (38)
Since the malicious agent does not participate, the following
inequality holds
θ ≤
∑N
i=1 x
∗
i
U(N) =
N−1√
N(N−1)+N
1− (N−1)(√N −√N−1)2 (39)
according to the NE conditions in (5). As N approaches
infinity, the asymptotic total utility is given by
lim
N→∞
U(d∗) = 1− lim
N→∞
(N−1)(
√
N −√N − 1)2
= 1− lim
N→∞
N−1
(
√
N +
√
N − 1)2
= 3/4. (40)
To enforce x∗0 = 0, θ can not exceed the corresponding
threshold,
θ ≤ 4
3
lim
N→∞
N − 1√
N(N−1) +N =
2
3
. (41)
Case 2: x∗0 > 0. The NE conditions result in the following
equations
vi∑n
j=0 x
∗
j
− vix
∗
i∑n
j=0 x
∗
j
= 1, ∀i = 1, · · · , n, (42)∑n
j=1 vix
∗
i∑n
j=0 x
∗
j
=
1
θ
. (43)
Summing the above equations together, we have
∑n
j=0
x∗j =
θ
∑n
j=1 vj
nθ + 1
(44)
and
U(d∗) =
∑n
j=1 vj
nθ + 1
. (45)
Denote by v the minimum valuation of A2 untill An. Here, v
must guarantee that these agents send messages to the timeline
with positive rates. Thus, the worst total utility of benign
agents is expressed as
U(d∗) = 1 + (n−1)v
nθ + 1
. (46)
The NE condition in (5) requires
v(n+ 1/θ) ≥ 1 + (n− 1)v. (47)
The above inequality gives rise to
v ≥ θ/(1 + θ). (48)
Submitting inequality (48) to (46) we obtain
Umal ≥ 1
1 + θ
. (49)
The set of valuations {vi}Ni=2 to minimize U are not unique.
For instance, U is minimized in the scenario where only two
players, A0 and A1, participate in the timeline competition at
the NE.
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Proof of Theorem 5
This theorem compares the NEs of two games, GA and
GB: the first one excludes the malicious agent, while the sec-
ond one considers the possible participation of the malicious
agent. We suppose that the participation of nA benign agents at
the NE in the former and the participation of nB benign agents
at the NE in the latter, given the set of valuations {vi}Ni=1. In
these two games, nA and nB might not be the same. We prove
this theorem via four steps.
Step 1: Proving nA ≥ nB . When the malicious agent
participates, the number of benign agents that send messages
with positive rates may decrease. This step can be easily
proven by contradiction from the NE conditions.
Step 2: Approximating the ratio of two utilities. The ratio
Umal
Unom is computed by
Umal
Unom =
∑nB
i=1 vi
1 + nBθ
· (∑nA
i=1
vi − nA(nA − 1)∑nA
i=1 1/vi
)−1
. (50)
According to the NE conditions of the game GB, since there
are nB benign agents participating in the competition, we have∑nB
i=1 vi∑nB
i=1 x
∗
i
= nB +
1
θ
and x∗i = 0 ∀i > nB. (51)
For any n with n > nB , the following inequality holds
vn∑n
i=1 x
∗
i
=
vn∑nB
i=1 x
∗
i
≤ 1 (52)
due to x∗i = 0. Hence, for nA and nB with nA ≥ nB , we
obtain ∑nA
i=1 vi∑nA
i=1 x
∗
i
=
∑nA
i=1 vi∑nB
i=1 x
∗
i
≤ nA + 1
θ
(53)
which implies ∑nA
i=1 vi
nA +
1
θ
≤
∑nB
i=1 vi
nB +
1
θ
(54)
Submitting (54) to (50), we derive the approximated lower
bound by
Umal
Unom ≥
∑nA
i=1 vi
1 + nAθ
· (∑nA
i=1
vi − nA(nA − 1)∑nA
i=1 1/vi
)−1
. (55)
Note that the NE of the game GA must involve two benign
agents. Eq.(55) serves as a lower bound for nA ≥ 2. When
only A1 participates in the NE of the game GB, the utility of
A1 is given by Umal = 11+θ . The total utility of benign agents
at the NE of the gameGA is no larger than 1. In this scenario,
Eq.(55) still holds at nA = 1. Therefore, Eq.(55) captures the
lower bound of UmalUnom for any nA ∈ [1, N ]. We drop all the
subscripts and obtain
Umal
Unom ≥
∑n
i=1 vi
∑n
i=1 1/vi∑n
i=1 vi
∑n
i=1 1/vi − n(n− 1)
· 1
1 + nθ
,
∀ 1 ≤ n ≤ N. (56)
We let ∆ denote the expression
∑n
i=1vi
∑n
i=1
1
vi
. The deriva-
tive of the right-hand of Eq.(56) over ∆ yields
−n(n− 1)
(∆− n(n− 1))2 ·
1
1 + nθ
≤ 0 (57)
where the equality holds only with n = 1. Therefore, the lower
bound of UmalUnom satisfies
Umal
Unom ≥
max∆
max∆− n(n− 1) ·
1
1 + nθ
. (58)
Step 3: Finding the maximum of the expression∑n
i=1vi
∑n
i=1
1
vi
.
To solve max∆, we first analyze its first-order derivatives
over each vi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Since vn is no larger than any
other vi, there exists
d∆
dvn
=
n∑
i=1
1
vi
− 1
v2n
n∑
i=1
vi =
n∑
i=1
v2n − v2i
viv2n
≤ 0. (59)
The equality holds only when all vn are the same. Hence, ∆ is
a decreasing function of vn. The maximum ∆ is obtained at the
point that vn reduces to its minimum value. When vn further
decreases, An will not participate in the timeline competition.
For ease of notation, we denote v as the minimum value for
vn.
We next analyze the optimal selection of vi for 2 ≤ i ≤
(n−1). By taking the first and the second-order derivatives,
we obtain the following equations
d∆
dvi
=
n∑
j=1
1
vj
− 1
v2i
n∑
j=1
vj , (60)
d2∆
dv2i
=
2
v3i
n∑
j=1, 6=i
vj > 0 (61)
for all 2 ≤ i ≤ (n−1). By letting d∆dvi = 0, we can obtain
a set of {vi}ni=2 to reach the extremum of ∆. However, their
second-order derivatives are strictly positive. This means that
the maximum of ∆ is not reached at these {vi}ni=2, but at the
boundaries, i.e. vi = 1 or vi = v for all 2 ≤ i ≤ (n−1).
We suppose vi = 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and vi = v for k+1 ≤
i ≤ n. Then, there yields
∆ = (k + (n− k)v)(k + n− k
v
)
= k2 + (n− k)2 + k(n− k)(v + 1
v
)
= n2 + k(n− k)(v + 1
v
− 2)
= n2 + k(n− k)(√v −
√
1
v
)2
= n2 + (
n2
4
− (n
2
− k)2)(√v −
√
1
v
)2. (62)
Given n and √v, we find that the maximum ∆ is obtained
at k = n2 if n is an even number, and is obtained at k =
⌈n2 ⌉ or k = ⌊n2 ⌋ if n is an odd number. Although k = ⌈n2 ⌉
and k = ⌊n2 ⌋ give rise to the same ∆ for fixed v, these two
scenarios correspond to different v at the NE. In what follows,
we examine the choice of v from the NE conditions.
Case i): n is an even number. Here, v is reached at the
boundary that An sends messages with an arbitrarily small
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rate, i.e. x∗n is infinitely approaching 0. The NE conditions
result in the following equations∑n
i=1 vi∑n
i=1 x
∗
i
= n+
1
θ
and vn∑n
i=1 x
∗
i
=
vn∑n
i=1 x
∗
i
= 1. (63)
The above equations solve v by
v =
nθ
nθ + 2
(64)
The maximum ∆ is thus computed as
max
even
∆ =
n2
4
(1 + v)(1 +
1
v
)
= n2 +
n
θ
− n
2
nθ + 2
− n
nθ2 + 2θ
. (65)
Case ii): n is an odd number and k = ⌊n2 ⌋. Eq.(63) gives
rise to
⌊n
2
⌋+ ⌈n
2
⌉v = (n+ 1
θ
)v. (66)
Hence, v is given by
v =
⌊n2 ⌋
⌊n2 ⌋+ 1θ
. (67)
Case iii): n is an odd number and k = ⌈n2 ⌉. Following the
same technique, we have
v =
⌈n2 ⌉
⌈n2 ⌉+ 1θ
>
⌊n2 ⌋
⌊n2 ⌋+ 1θ
. (68)
Obviously, ∆ is a decreasing function of v according to
Eq.(62). Therefore, we only consider Case i) and Case ii) to
compute the lower bound of UmalUmal . The maximum ∆ at the
case of odd n is given by
max
odd
∆ = (⌊n
2
⌋+ ⌈n
2
⌉v)(⌊n
2
⌋+ ⌈n
2
⌉1
v
)
=n2+
n(n+1)
θ(n−1)−
n(n+1)
θ(n−1)+2−
(n+1)2
θ2(n−1)2+2θ(n−1) .(69)
Step 4: Analyzing the lower bound of UmalUmal .
We consider the two cases with regard to n in Step 3
separately.
Case i): n is an even number. Submitting Eq.(65) to Eq.(58),
we obtain the following inequality
Umal
Unom ≥
1 + nθ
1 + 2θ + nθ2
. (70)
Then, there exists
Umal
Unom −
1
1 + θ
≥ (n− 1)θ
(1 + 2θ + nθ2)(1 + θ)
> 0 (71)
where n is no less than 2. Hence, the lower bound of UmalUnom
is expressed as
Umal
Unom >
1
1 + θ
. (72)
Case ii): n is an odd number and k = ⌊n2 ⌋. Submitting
Eq.(67) to Eq.(58), the lower bound of UmalUnom is given by
Umal
Unom ≥
n(n− 1)θ + (n+ 1)
(n+ 1) + n(n− 1)θ2 + 2θn . (73)
Then, we derive the following inequality
Umal
Unom−
1
1+θ
≥ θ(n−1)
2
((n+1)+n(n−1)θ2+2θn)(1+θ) ≥ 0. (74)
Therefore, the lower bound of UmalUnom is formally given by
Umal
Unom ≥
1
1 + θ
(75)
where it is tight for n = 1.
Proof of Theorem 6
First of all, the social optimal net utility Vmax approaches
1 asymptotically since Umax is 1. We suppose x∗i > 0 for
1 ≤ i ≤ n and x∗i = 0 for n+1 ≤ i ≤ N at the NE. Similar
to the preceding proof, two cases, x∗0 = 0 and x∗0 > 0, are
considered.
Case 1: x∗0 = 0. The total net utility of benign agents is
obtained by
V(d∗) =
∑n
i=1
vi − n
2 − 1∑n
i=1 1/vi
. (76)
As proved before, U(d∗) is a strictly convex function over
the set of valuations {vi}ni=2, so is V(d∗). Hence, V(d∗) is
minimized at its unique interior point if it exists at the feasible
region. We differentiate V(d∗) over vi (2 ≤ i ≤ n) and obtain
∂V
∂vi
= 1− n
2−1
(
∑n
j=1 1/vi)
2
· 1
v2i
, 2 ≤ i ≤ n. (77)
If there exists a feasible solution to ∂U∂vi = 0 for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n,
it minimizes V(d∗) with the participation of n benign agents.
Due to the symmetric property of Eq.(77), all vi (2 ≤ i ≤ n)
are the same when minimizing V(d∗). Hence, we can easily
obtain
va = vi =
√
n2 − 1− (n− 1), ∀ 2 ≤ i ≤ n. (78)
Submitting Eq.(78) to (76), we obtain
V(d∗) = 1 + (n−1)(
√
n2 − 1− (n+1))
1 + 12
(√
n2−1 + (n−1)) . (79)
The total rate of messages generated by benign agents at the
NE is computed as∑n
i=1
x∗i =
n− 1∑n
j=1 1/vj
=
n− 1
1 + 12
(√
n2−1 + (n−1)) . (80)
To enforce x∗0 = 0 at this NE, the willingness factor θ should
satisfy
θ <
(1 + (n− 1)va)(1 + (n− 1)/va)
n− 1 − n (81)
according to the expression (5). We next compare V(d∗) for
different n ∈ [2, N ]. Suppose that n is a continuous variable.
We differentiate V(d∗) over n and get dV(d∗)dn < 0. Therefore,
the worst total net utility of benign agents is obtained when all
of them participate at the NE. The minimum total net utility
is given by
Vmal ≥ 1 + (N−1)(
√
N2 − 1− (N+1))
1 + 12
(√
N2−1 + (N−1)) . (82)
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Case 2: x∗0 > 0. The total net utility of benign agents is
expressed in the following equation
V(d∗) = U(d∗)−
∑n
i=1
x∗i
=
1−nθ
1+nθ
n∑
i=1
vi+(
n∑
i=1
1
vi
)
(θ
∑n
i=1 vi)
2
(nθ+1)2
. (83)
We differentiate V(d∗) over vi and obtain
dV
dvi
=
1−nθ
1+nθ
+ (
θ
1+nθ
)2(
−1
v2i
(
n∑
j=1
vj)
2+
n∑
j=1
2
vj
n∑
j=1
vj) (84)
and
d2V
dv2i
= (
θ
1+nθ
)2
2
vi
(
(
∑n
j=1 vj
vi
− 1)2+
n∑
j=1, 6=i
1
vj
)
> 0. (85)
From Eqs.(84) and (85), there exists a unique interior point to
minimize V(d∗) that satisfies 0 ≤ vi ≤ 1 for all i = 2, · · · , n.
Due to the symmetric property, there have v∗i = v∗j for any i
and j, 2 ≤ i, j ≤ n. Hence, we denote by v(n)b the identical
valuation of the benign agents except A1 at this interior point.
By letting the derivative dVdvi be 0, we obtain the following
equation
2(n− 1)v3 + (3 − 2n+ θ−2)v2 − 1 = 0 (86)
where v(n)b is the feasible solution. Note that the minimum
might take values at the boundary if the interior point is
outside of the feasible region. Thus, we need to examine the
possible scenarios where the valuations of some benign agents
are chosen at the boundary. i) v∗i = 1 and 0 < v∗j < 1 for
2 ≤ i, j ≤ n. We will show that this scenario does not happen.
For any v∗j with 0 < v∗j < 1, there exists dVdvj |vj=v∗j = 0.
Thus, there must have dVdvi |vi=1 > 0. This means that any
local minimum cannot contain v∗i = 1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ n.
ii) v∗i = 0 and 0 < v∗j < 1 for 2 ≤ i, j ≤ n. In this
scenario, Ai does not send messages. It is equivalent to the
situation that n−1 benign agents participate in the timeline
competition. Thus, the interior point leads to the minimum
V(d∗) for fixed n.
The interior point results in the minimum V given that the
top n benign agents send messages with positive rates at the
NE. However, it might not lead to the global minimum, i.e.
the minimum for each n ∈ [1, N ]. We need to compare the
minimum V(d∗) for each different n. Naturally, the minimum
V(d∗) is any n is formally given by
Vmal ≥ (1−nθ)(1+(n−1)v
(n)
b )
1+nθ
+(1+
n−1
v
(n)
b
)(
θ(1+(n−1)v(n)b )
1+nθ
)2}, n = 1, · · ·, N (87)
where v(n)b is the solution to Eq.(86) in (0, 1).
Proof of Theorem 7
Consider two games, GA and GB: the former excludes the
malicious agent, the latter considers the possible participation
of the malicious agent. Suppose that nA benign agents partic-
ipate in GA at the NE and nB participate in GB at the NE.
It is easy to prove by contradiction to show nA ≥ nB .
Knowing from the proof of Theorem 6 and Theorem 9, we
have
Vnom =
∑nA
i=1
vi − n
2
A − 1∑nA
i=1 1/vi
(88)
for the game GA. For the game GB, there exist
Vmal = 1−nBθ
1+nBθ
nB∑
i=1
vi+(
nB∑
i=1
1
vi
)
(θ
∑nB
i=1 vi)
2
(nBθ+1)2
(89)
if the malicious agent participates at the NE, and Vmal = Vnom
if it does not participate at the NE. We then prove this theorem
via three steps.
Step 1: Proving
∑n
i=1 vi− n
2−1∑
n
i=1 1/vi
decreases w.r.t. n (2 ≤
n ≤ nA).
According to the NE conditions, there must have
vn ≥ n− 2∑n−1
j=1 1/vj
, ∀2 ≤ n ≤ nA. (90)
Otherwise, the number of benign agents participating at the
NE will be less than nA.
Denote by Φ(n) =
∑n
i=1 vi − n
2−1∑
n
i=1 1/vi
. We prove by
induction that Φ(n) decreases w.r.t. n (2 ≤ n ≤ nA).
i) For n = 2, there have Φ(1) = 1 and Φ(2) = 1+v2− 3v21+v2 .
We subtract Φ(2) from Φ(1) and obtain
Φ(1)− Φ(2) = 3
1 + v2
− v2 = 1− (1− v2)
2
1 + v2
> 0.
ii) we assume Φ(n − 1) > Φ(n) for n = k (2 ≤ k ≤
nA− 1). We expand the expression of Φ(k) and Φ(k− 1) and
obtain
Φ(k)− Φ(k−1)
=
∑k
i=1
vi − k
2 − 1∑k
i=1 1/vi
−
∑k−1
i=1
vi +
(k−1)2 − 1∑k−1
i=1 1/vi
= vk − k
2 − 1∑k
i=1 1/vi
+
(k−1)2 − 1∑k−1
i=1 1/vi
=
vk
k∑
i=1
1
vi
k−1∑
i=1
1
vi
+ ((k−1)2−1)
k∑
i=1
1
vi
− (k2−1)
k−1∑
i=1
1
vi
k∑
i=1
1
vi
k−1∑
i=1
1
vi
=
vk(
k−1∑
i=1
1
vi
)2 + (2− 2k)
k−1∑
i=1
1
vi
+ k
2−2k
vk
k∑
i=1
1
vi
k−1∑
i=1
1
vi
< 0. (91)
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iii) For n = k+1, we subtract Φ(k) from Φ(k+1). There
has
Φ(k + 1)− Φ(k)
=
vk+1(
∑k
i=1 1/vi)
2 − 2k∑ki=1 1/vi + (k2 − 1)/vk+1∑k+1
i=1 1/vi
∑k
i=1 1/vi
=
vk+1(
k−1∑
i=1
1
vi
)2 + (2− 2k)
k−1∑
i=1
1
vi
+ k
2−2k
vk+1
k+1∑
i=1
1
vi
k∑
i=1
1
vi
. (92)
The denominator of Eq.(92) can be easily shown to be
strictly convex on vk+1. When vk takes the value k−1∑k
j=1 1/vj
,
there has Φ(k) − Φ(k−1) = 0. When vk+1 takes the value
vk, the denominator equals to that of Eq.(91), which is less
than 0. Therefore, we can conclude Φ(n) ≤ Φ(n− 1) for all
2 ≤ n ≤ nA.
Step 2: Approximating the ratio of two net utilities. The
ratio VmalVnom can be lower bounded by
Vmal
Vnom ≥
1−nBθ
1+nBθ
∑nB
i=1 vi+(
∑nB
i=1
1
vi
)
(θ
∑nB
i=1 vi)
2
(nBθ+1)2∑nB
i=1 vi −
n2
B
−1
∑nB
i=1 1/vi
(93)
for nB ≥ 2 due to the analysis in Step 1. For the special
case nB = 1, the denominator is 1, the maximum achievable
total net utility. Therefore, the lower bound of VmalVnom can be
expressed as Eq.(93) for nB ≥ 1. For the sake of convenience,
we omit the subscript in the variable nB .
Step 3: Computing the lower bound of VmalVnom . Let ∆ be∑n
i=1 vi
∑n
i=1 1/vi. The lower bound can be simplified as
Vmal
Vnom ≥
1
(1 + nθ)2
(1 − n2θ2)∆ + θ2∆2
∆− (n2 − 1) . (94)
We differentiate the right-hand expression of Eq.(94) over ∆
and find that the derivative is positive. This means that the
minimum of the right-hand expression is obtained when ∆ is
minimized. Since the minimum ∆ is n2 obtained at vi = 1
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the lower bound of the ratio VmalVnom is
Vmal
Vnom ≥
n2
(1 + nθ)2
. (95)
The expression n
2
(1+nθ)2 is strictly increasing w.r.t. n. We
finally conclude the worst case of the ratio as
Vmal
Vnom ≥
1
(1 + θ)2
. (96)
Proof of Theorem 8
Similarly, we consider two cases separately, x∗0 = 0 and
x∗0 > 0. Note that the utility functions of all the benign agents
are linear.
Case 1: x∗0 = 0. It is very direct to validate that the maximum
total utility is 1. For instance, when vi is equal to 1 for all
1 ≤ i ≤ N , the total utility is maximized. However, the set
of valuations {vi} that lead to this maximum are not unique.
We hereby want to find the condition to enforce x∗0 = 0.
Suppose that n benign agents participate in the timeline
competition at the NE. For an arbitrary set of valuations
{vi}ni=2, the NE conditions yield
θ ≤
∑n
i=1
x∗i (97)
for x∗0 = 0. It is easy to validate from our preceding proof
that x∗i increases with vi. At the same time, when more benign
agents participate at the NE, the total rate of sending messages
increases accordingly. Hence, x∗0 = 0 is no longer true when
there has θ ≤ N−1N .
Case 2: x∗0 > 0. We suppose x∗i > 0 for 2 ≤ i ≤ n and x∗i = 0
for n+1 ≤ i ≤ N . According to Eq. (45), the total utility of
benign agents is given by U(d∗) =
∑n
j=1 vj
nθ+1 . The maximum
total utility is achieved at the point vi = 1 for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤
n, that is, U(d∗) ≤ nnd+1 . As n increases, this upper bound
increases accordingly. Then, there has U(d∗) ≤ NNd+1 for any
n. When θ is greater than N−1N , x
∗
0 is always positive. The
upper bound of the maximum total utility is given by
Umal ≤ N
1 + θN
. (98)
Combining the analyses in two cases together, we prove this
theorem.
Analysis of Corollary 1
Consider two games, GA and GB: the former excludes the
malicious agent, the latter considers the possible participation
of the malicious agent. Suppose that nA benign agents par-
ticipate in GA at the NE and nB participate in GB at the
NE.
When the malicious agent does not participate at the NE of
GB, both NEs are the same so that the ratio UmalUnom is 1. When
θ is greater than N−1N , the malicious agent will participate
for sure. In this scenario, it is difficult to compute the upper
bound of UmalUnom . The reason is that
Umal
Unom with nA = nB does
not necessarily constitute an upper bound for each n. Hence,
we only aim to find an approximated upper bound for UmalUnom .
i). We first consider the case that θ is slightly larger than
N−1
N . When θ is less than
N−1
N , the maximum total utility is
obtained when the valuations of the participating agents are
1 uniformly. When θ is slightly larger than N−1N , the number
of the benign agents that participate in the game GB will
not change. Because Umal is an increasing function of the
valuations, the maximum Umal is obtained by n1+nθ where n
is the number of the benign agents that participate. Then, the
upper bound of the ratio UmalUnom is approximated by
Umal
Unom ≤
∑n
i=1 vi
∑n
i=1 1/vi∑n
i=1 vi
∑n
i=1 1/vi − n(n− 1)
· 1
1 + nθ
. (99)
Following the proof of Theorem 5, the minimum of the
expression
∑n
i=1 vi
∑n
i=1 1/vi is n2. The lower bound ofUmal
Unom can be further simplified as
Umal
Unom ≤
n
1 + θn
≤ N
1 +Nθ
. (100)
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ii) We next consider the case that θ is large enough. In the
game GB, nB might be larger if the valuations of the benign
agents increase. The highest improvement takes place when
nB increases from 1 to 2. However, Wmal only increases from
1
1+θ to
2
2+θ , which is very small for some large θ. In the game
GA, the minimum Unom is given by Eq.(8) in Theorem 4. The
minimum is achieved when all the benign agents participate
in the timeline competition at the NE. The valuations of
A2 to AN are
√
N(N − 1)− (N − 1) uniformly. When v2
increases to 1, Unom improves significantly. Hence, when θ
is large enough, the approximated upper bound of UmalUnom takes
place at nB = 1 and nA = N where the minimum Unom is
reached. Then, the approximated upper bound is given by
Umal
Unom ≤
1
(1 + θ)(1− (N − 1)(
√
N −√N − 1)2) . (101)
Combing the above two cases together, we obtain the
approximated upper bound for the ratio UmalUnom as
Umal
Unom ≤
max
{ N
1+Nθ
,
1
(1+θ)(1−(N−1)(√N−√N−1)2)
}
.(102)
Proof of Theorem 9
We suppose that x∗i > 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and x∗i = 0
for n+1 ≤ i ≤ N at the NE. The optimal total net utility
is found for each n in the first step. We then compare the
optimal total net utilities among all the possible n. Two cases
are considered, x∗0 = 0 or x∗0 > 0 (i.e. whether the malicious
agent sends messages to the timeline or not).
Case 1: x∗0 = 0. The total net utility of benign agents is given
by
V(d∗) =
∑n
i=1
vi − n
2 − 1∑n
i=1 1/vi
. (103)
According to the analysis in the proof of Theorem 4, V(d∗)
is a strictly convex function so that the maximum V(d∗) is
obtain at the boundary of the feasible region, i.e. vi = 1 for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In other words, there has max V(d∗) = 1n .
This maximum is achieved under the condition θ < n−1n such
that the malicious agent A0 does not participate.
Case 2: x∗0 > 0. The total net utility of benign agents is given
in Eq.(83). The proof of Theorem 6 manifests that there exists
a unique local minimum. The maximum total net utility should
be obtained at the boundary. Here, we only consider the right
boundary, i.e. vi = 1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ n, because the left boundary
corresponds to the participation of less than n benign agents.
Then, the maximum total net utility is obtained by
V(d∗) = n
(nd+ 1)2
.
In order to guarantee x∗0 > 0 at the NE, the willingness factor
θ must satisfy θ ≥ n−1n .
We then proceed to find the maximum V(d∗) for all
n ∈ [1, N ] that satisfies the corresponding condition θ ≥ n−1n .
Let n1 and n2 be two different integers in the set [1, N ]. We
compare the total net utilities at these two different scenarios.
V(d∗)|n1 − V(d∗)|n2 =
(n1 − n2)(1 − n1n2θ2)
(1 + n1θ)2(1 + n2θ)2
.
By endowing n1 and n2 different values, we obtain
- V(d∗)|1 < V(d∗)|2 if 12 < θ <
√
2
2 ;
- V(d∗)|1 < V(d∗)|3 is not true (i.e. θ ∈ (0,
√
3
3 )∩(23 ,∞) =
∅);
- V(d∗)|1 < V(d∗)|4 is not true (i.e. θ ∈ (0, 12 )∩ (34 ,∞) =
∅);
- V(d∗)|2 < V(d∗)|3 is not true (i.e. d ∈ (0,
√
6
6 )∩(23 ,∞) =
∅).
This is to say, for any θ, the maximum V(d∗) is either
V(d∗)|1 or V(d∗)|2.
We next merge the analyses of the cases x∗0 = 0 and x∗0 > 0.
When θ is in the range (n−2n−1 ,
n−1
n ), the optimal total net utility
is 1n if x
∗
0 = 0 and n ≥ 2. The optimal total net utility is
n−1
(1+(n−1)θ)2 if x
∗
0 > 0. When n ≥ 3 and θ ∈ (n−2n−1 , n−1n ), the
following expression always holds
n−1
(1 + (n−1)θ)2 >
1
n
, ∀ n ≥ 3.
The participation of A0 at the NE always generates a better
upper bound of the total net utility of benign agents than that
in the absence of A0. Therefore, we only need to compare
three outcomes, 1(1+θ)2 for θ > 0,
2
(1+2θ)2 for θ >
1
2 , and
1
2
for 0 < θ ≤ 12 .
We eventually summarize our results as follows
Vmal
Vmax ≤


1
(1+θ)2 if θ ≤
√
2−1
1
2 if
√
2−1 < θ ≤ 12
2
(1+2θ)2 , if
1
2 < θ ≤
√
2
2
1
(1+θ)2 , if θ >
√
2
2
. (104)
Proof of Theorem 10
Note that Wmax is the maximum revenue obtained by the
OSN excluding the player A0. The NE conditions yield
Wmal =
∑n
i=0
x∗i =
θ
∑n
i=1 vi
1 + nθ
(105)
when the top n benign agents and the malicious agent partic-
ipate at the NE; they also give rise to
Wmal =
∑n
i=1
x∗i =
n− 1∑n
i=1 1/vi
(106)
when the malicious agent does not participate. It is clear to
observe that Wmal is a decreasing function for any vi (2 ≤
i ≤ n). When the malicious agent is excluded, the revenue of
the OSN is given by
Wmax = max
{vi}Ni=2
n− 1∑n
i=1 1/vi
(107)
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where n is determined by {vi}Ni=2. Similarly, Eq.(107) is also
a decreasing function of any vi (2 ≤ i ≤ n). By enumerating
all the possible n, we can see
Wmax = N − 1
N
. (108)
Step 1: Proving the lower bound. Eq.(105) and (106) both
show that Wmal is the decreasing function of any vi (2 ≤ i ≤
n). Thus, when the minimum Wmal is obtained, all the benign
agents from A2 to An have the same lowest valuation denoted
by v. However, we need to find v for each case, x∗0 > 0 and
x∗0 = 0.
Case i): x∗i > 0. The NE conditions yield
1∑n
i=0 x
∗
i
− x
∗
1
(
∑n
i=0 x
∗
i )
2
= 1, (109)
v∑n
i=0 x
∗
i
− vx
∗
j
(
∑n
i=0 x
∗
i )
2
= 1, ∀2 ≤ j ≤ n, (110)
x∗1 + (n− 1)vx∗j
(
∑n
i=0 x
∗
i )
2
=
1
θ
. (111)
When the benign agents from A2 to An are at the boundary
of participation, we obtain
v =
∑n
i=1
x∗i (112)
from Eq.(110) by letting x∗j be infinitely small. Combining
Eq.(112) and (105) together, we obtain the following equation
for any given θ and n
v =
θ(1 + (n− 1)v)
1 + nθ
. (113)
Then, the minimum valuation v is given by
v =
θ
1 + θ
(114)
which is independent of any n. The minimum revenue of the
OSN is
Wmal ≥ θ
1 + θ
. (115)
Case ii): x∗0 = 0. The minimum valuation v should be
above a certain threshold such that the malicious agent will
not participate in the timeline competition. According to the
NE conditions, there has
x∗1 + (n− 1)vx∗j
(
∑n
i=0 x
∗
i )
2
≤ 1
θ
. (116)
Summing up Eqs.(109), (110) and (116) together, we obtain
n∑
i=0
x∗i =
n∑
i=1
x∗i =
n− 1
(1 + (n− 1)/v) ≤
θ(1 + (n− 1)v)
1 + nθ
(117)
due to x∗0 = 0. The equality holds when v reaches the stage
that the malicious agent is at the boundary of participation.
Eq.(117) gives rise to the following equation to solve v,
v2 + (
1
n− 1 − (1 +
1
θ
))v + 1 = 0. (118)
Here, θ is no larger than n−1n . Otherwise, the malicious
agent will always participate in the timeline competition. We
next examine whether there exists a feasible solution to v in
Eq.(118). The expression 1n−1−(1+ 1θ ) is always negative with
θ ∈ [0, n−1n ]. This means that there are two positive roots to
Eq.(118). The product of these two roots is 1, which indicates
that one root is in the range (0, 1) and the other is greater than
1. Thus, we solve v by
v =
(1 + 1θ )− 1n−1 −
√
((1 + 1θ )− 1n−1 )2 − 4
2
. (119)
When the valuations of A2 to An take v in Eq.(119), both
Eq.(105) and Eq.(106) yield the same revenue to the OSN at
this boundary condition.
So far, we have computed two possible v for two cases
x∗0 = 0 and x∗0 > 0 separately. We denote by vA the minimum
valuation in Eq.(119) and by vB the minimum valuation in
Eq.(114). The final question is whether vA or vB results in
the minimum revenue of the OSN. We subtract vB from vA
and obtain
vA − vB =
(1+ 1θ )− 1n−1 −
√
((1 + 1θ )− 1n−1 )2 − 4
2
− θ
1 + θ
=
1
2
[(
(1 +
1
θ
)− 1
n− 1 −
2θ
1 + θ
)
−
√
((1 +
1
θ
)− 1
n− 1)
2 − 4
]
. (120)
Since 2θ1+θ is less than 2, it is easy to validate that vA is
always greater than vB . Our previous analysis has shown that
the revenue of the OSN is a decreasing function of v no matter
whether the malicious agent participate or not. Therefore, the
minimum revenue should be obtained in the case x∗0 > 0. To
summarize, we have the following lower bound
Wmal
Wmax ≥
θN
(1 + θ)(N − 1) . (121)
Step 2: Proving the upper bound. If the malicious agent does
not participate at the NE, the maximum achievable revenue
of the OSN is the same as Wmax. On the contrary, if the
malicious agent participates at the NE, the maximum Wmal
is obtained by
Wmal ≥ θN
(1 + θ)(N − 1) . (122)
Then, the upper bound is
Wmal
Wmax ≤ max{1,
θN2
(1 + θN)(N − 1)}. (123)
Proof of Theorem 11
Note that Wmal is the same as Wnom if the malicious
agent does not participate at the NE. Hence, we only consider
the scenario with the participation of the malicious agent.
Similar to the proceeding proofs, we denote GA as the game
excluding the malicious agent, and GB as that with the
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possible participation of the malicious agent. Suppose that nA
benign agents send messages with positive rates at the NE of
GA and nB benign agents do so at the NE of GB. Then,
there exists nA ≥ nB . The ratio WmalWnom satisfies
Wmal
Wnom =
θ
∑nB
i=1 vi
∑nA
i=1 1/vi
(1 + nBθ)(nA − 1) (124)
According to the inequality (54), this ratio has the following
bound
Wmal
Wnom ≥
θ
∑n
i=1 vi
∑n
i=1 1/vi
(1 + nθ)(n− 1) (125)
where the subscripts on the variable n are removed. It is
intuitive to see that vi(∀i ≥ 2) should be as large as possible
at the right-hand of Eq.(125). For the given θ, vi should
be chosen to allow the participation of the malicious agent.
Therefore, according to the NE conditions, the maximum ratio
is obtained by {vi}ni=2 chosen from
θ
∑n
i=1 vi
1 + nθ
=
n− 1∑
1/vi
(126)
The above equality gives rise to∑n
i=1
vi
∑ 1
vi
≥ 1
θ
(n− 1)(1 + nθ). (127)
Submitting inequality (127) to (125), we obtain the lower
bound WmalWnom ≥ 1.
The upper bound can be solved directly. Consider a scenario
with v2 = ǫ and vi = 0 for all i ≥ 3. The total revenue of the
OSN is small enough with the asymptotic bound Wnom = 0.
For any given θ and the participation of the malicious agent
at the NE, the total revenue is finite. Therefore, the ratio has
the property WmalWnom ∝ ∞ which means that it is unbounded.
